RUSTICI v. MALLOY
application for temporary injunction and order to show cause and
a verified complaint dated November 12, 1997 made returnable to
the court on December 9, 1997. The defendant filed a motion to
dismiss dated December 1, 1997 when the parties appeared for
CT Page 6610
the show cause hearing. Because the plaintiff had not had an
opportunity to address the issues raised in the motion to
dismiss, the matter was rescheduled for December 22, 1997. In
addition, the court noted that the prior pending action, brought
in Stamford Superior Court, was withdrawn.
On December 16, 1997, the plaintiffs filed a motion for
permission to add new plaintiffs and to file an amended application
for temporary injunction and an amended complaint as well as
a memorandum in opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
In their amended application, the plaintiffs request that the
court enjoin the defendants from:
property of the Long Ridge volunteer company;
relationship between the Long Ridge volunteer company
and its professional fire fighters;
maintain as many professional and volunteer fire
fighters at Station 2 as are necessary to fulfill
the responsibilities of the Long Ridge volunteer
company; and
Stamford Fire and Rescue Department at Station 2.
On December 22, 1997, the court denied the motion to dismiss
and overruled without prejudice the objection to the filing of
the amended complaint. The court continued the matter until
January 20, 1998 and took evidence over several days. On January
28, the court entered the following orders pending its decision
on the application for temporary injunction: that the city not
interfere with the organization, status and property of the Long
Ridge volunteer company; that it not withhold or divert tax
proceeds which have been provided for in the present budget from
the Long Ridge Fire Company; and that payments be made in a
timely fashion.
The central issues to be addressed are: whether the court has
the necessary jurisdiction to determine whether the charter was
violated; whether the plaintiffs must exhaust their
administrative remedies regarding the alleged interference with
CT Page 6611
the collective bargaining relationship; and whether an injunction
should issue in response to the plaintiffs’ claims for relief.
The court finds the following facts from observing the
demeanor of the witnesses, from their testimony and from the
exhibits, notably the labor contracts, the charter and the by-laws
of the Long Ridge Fire Company. The plaintiffs, Rustici, Re,
Nau, and Schaller, among others, are professional fire fighters
in the Long Ridge Fire Company, (“LRFC”) a volunteer fire company
in the Long Ridge section of the city of Stamford. They are paid
employees and members of the Long Ridge Paid Drivers
Association, (“LRPDA”) the collective bargaining representative
of the fire company’s professional employees. Nau and Schaller
are residents of the Long Ridge area of Stamford and pay property
taxes to the city. The defendant Malloy is the mayor of Stamford.
The defendant Haselkamp was director of labor relations in
Stamford at relevant times but is presently the director of human
resources. The defendant Byrne was, at all relevant times, the
director of public safety, health and welfare in the city. The
defendant city of Stamford is a municipality in the state of
Connecticut. The defendant LRFC is one of five volunteer fire
companies in the city.
On February 8, 1996, Kurt Semmel, chief of the LRFC granted
an interview to the local newspaper, the Stamford Advocate. In
the interview, Semmel discussed his budget request for 24-hour
staffing of the LRFC which was manned from 8 a.m. to 1 a.m. To
provide full-time coverage, two additional men were needed for
overnight and weekend coverage. He gave examples of emergency
situations wherein lack of staffing could have resulted in lack
of protection of the public safety. He stated that his requests
through the budgetary process had not been granted by the former
mayor, Stanley Esposito, and he hoped that the new mayoral
administration would be more sympathetic. The interview also
discussed the support of the other volunteer districts, all of which
had “at least one paid person providing bare bones coverage each
hour” as well as the support of Local 786 of the International
Association of Firefighters (“IAFF”) for informational picketing
in North Stamford. As a result of this interview, which was
headlined, Fire Company sounds alarm, the mayor formulated a plan to
station Engine 6 of the downtown department at Station 2 of Long
Ridge.
On February 9, Semmell was called to a meeting at the
conference room of the mayor’s office. He asked Nau to accompany
CT Page 6612
him. Also present at the meeting were Chief Ron Graner and Deputy
Chief Brown of the Stamford Fire and Rescue Department, (“downtown”),
Dave Roberts, a fireman from the downtown department,
James Romaniello, president of local 786 of the IAFF, and John
Byrne, health and safety director for the city of Stamford. The
paid drivers are members of their own association but also
members of Local 786 of the IAFF. No one was present from the
other volunteer fire departments.
Before the meeting, the mayor met with Graner, Brown and
Romaniello and told them of his plan. When he met with Semmel and
Nau, he stated that because of the article in the Stamford
Advocate, he felt compelled to address the situation and was
therefore sending Engine 6 with a complement of sixteen men to
Long Ridge Fire Station 2. The mayor did not declare a state of
emergency. He subsequently announced this decision to the press.
Neither Semmel nor Nau participated in, acquiesced in or
consented to this action. Neither the membership nor the trustees
of the LRFC were consulted before this action was taken.
Although Semmel, together with Gunther Schaller and the
president of the Springdale Volunteer Fire Company met with the
mayor several days later to discuss the need for two additional
firefighters in lieu of the sixteen fire fighters from outside
the LRFC, the sixteen firefighters were not removed. No chief of
the LRFC asked for the removal of the downtown fire fighters. The
cost to the taxpayers of the sixteen fire fighters is $1.2
million annually, while the cost of the two additional
firefighters is calculated at $150,000.
Behind the mayor’s move was his desire to implement the
recommendations of a consultant’s report which had been prepared
for his predecessor. That report addressed the change in the
provision of volunteer services and the demographic changes in
Stamford. It concluded that there was an excess of fire fighters
in the downtown department and a shortage of fire fighters in the
volunteer ranks. The mayor had been attempting to obtain a
consolidation agreement with the volunteer fire companies but
negotiations with the LRFC and the LRPDA had not progressed to
the satisfaction of any of the parties.
The thrust of such an agreement would make the professional
fire fighters of the LRFC, members of the downtown department
and city employees. Consolidation would affect their pension
rights, ranks, salary and other conditions of employment.
CT Page 6613
Negotiations between city officials Haselkamp, Byrne, and
Romaniello, the labor representative of Local 786 of the IAFF,
and the labor representatives of the LRPDA occurred throughout
1996 and into 1997. These negotiations have failed to resolve the
disputes among the parties. Animosity and distrust has developed
and affected relations between all parties. In October 1997, the
present plaintiffs brought an action in the Stamford judicial
district against Romaniello, Local 786 of the IAFF, Malloy,
Haselkamp, Byrne and the city of Stamford, which action was
withdrawn after the present suit was started. Intermittent
discussions have ensued but have been fruitless. Additional facts
relevant to the disposition of the application for temporary
injunction shall be provided as needed.
The first issue the court must address is whether or not it
has jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs’ first request, to
wit: to enter a temporary injunction to enjoin the defendants
from interfering with the organization, status and property of
the LRFC. The defendants argue that the plaintiffs do not have
standing to seek this relief because this relief must be sought
by the LRFC. The LRFC is not a plaintiff to this action, although
it is a defendant.[fn1]
In Community Collaborative of Bridgeport Inc. v. Ganim,
241 Conn. 546 , 552-53 , 98 A.2d 245 (1997), the court said that
“. . . [i]t is a basic principle of law that a plaintiff must have
standing for the court to have jurisdiction. Standing is the
legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot
rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he has
. . . some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or
equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the
controversy. . . .”
In Alarm Applications Co. v. Simsbury Volunteer Fire Co.,
179 Conn. 541 , 548-49 , 427 A.2d 822 (1980), the court stated: “We
have long recognized the capacity of taxpayers of towns and
cities to challenge the legality of the actions of their
municipal officers by seeking injunctive relief against such
action. . . . We have said that a party’s status as a taxpayer
without a demonstration by him of some tangible injury, does not
by itself confer standing upon him where the defendant is a
municipal corporation. . . . Thus, our cases in this area have
CT Page 6614
required two conditions for the maintenance of actions seeking to
challenge municipal conduct: (1) the plaintiff must be a
taxpayer of the defendant municipal entity; and (2) the plaintiff
must allege and demonstrate that the allegedly improper municipal
conduct causes him to suffer `some pecuniary or other great
injury.’” (Citations omitted.)
In the present matter, the plaintiffs Nau and Schaller are
taxpayers and residents of the Long Ridge area and are,
therefore, served by the LFRC. The injury which they suffer is the
increase in their taxes which results from the cost of stationing
Engine 6, $1.2 million, compared to the cost of two additional
fire fighters, $150,000, and the impact of any change in their
employer’s status, obtained through illegality or coercive
actions, upon their rank, seniority, benefits and pension rights.
The court finds that these plaintiffs have standing to bring this
action. Accordingly, the court has jurisdiction to hear this
application for temporary injunction.
“To prevail on an application for temporary injunction, the
burden is on the applicant to establish (1) a reasonable degree
of probability of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm
with no adequate remedy at law, and; (3) the harm likely to be
suffered by the applicants is greater than that resulting from
the interference occasioned by an injunction.” Arrowhead By the
Lake v. Arrowhead, Superior Court, judicial district of
Waterbury, Docket No. 128458 (December 31, 1996, Riefberg, J.);
see also Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals,
196 Conn. 451 , 457-58 , 493 A.2d 229 (1985).
The court finds that there is a likelihood that the
plaintiffs will prevail on the merits of the case with regard to
the charter violation.
In Stamford Ridgeway Associates v. Board of Representatives,
214 Conn. 407 , 423-24 , 572 A.2d 951 (1990), the court
stated as follows: “It has been well established that a city’s
charter is the fountainhead of municipal powers . . . . The charter
serves as an enabling act, both creating power and prescribing
the form in which it must be exercised. . . . Agents of a
city, including [the board of representatives], have no source of
authority beyond the charter. . . . In construing a city charter,
the rules of statutory construction generally apply. . . . A city
CT Page 6615
charter must be construed, if possible, so as reasonably to
promote its ultimate purpose. . . . In arriving at the intention of
the framers of the charter the whole and every part of the
instrument must be taken and compared together. In other words,
effect should be given, if possible, to every section, paragraph,
sentence, clause and word in the instrument and related laws.
The real intention when once accurately and indubitably
ascertained, will prevail over the literal sense of the terms.
When the words used are explicit, they are to govern, of course.
If not, then recourse is had to the context, the occasion and
necessity of the provision, the mischief felt, and the remedy in
view. The language employed must be given its plain and obvious
meaning, and, if the language is not ambiguous a court cannot
arbitrarily add to or subtract from the words employed. A charter
provision, like a statute must be definite and certain. An
individual must be able to determine whether his or her proposed
activity is prohibited.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.)
Section 5-40-3 (d) of the charter of the city of Stamford
provides as follows:
Rescue Department under the control of the
Chief shall be limited to the City Fire
Service District, except in the case of an
emergency. Nothing in this Charter shall be
construed to affect the organization, status
or property of the Volunteer Departments of
Stamford. The Fire Service Districts are indicated
on the map of Fire Service Districts,
prepared by the City Engineer, dated January
21, 1997 and on file in the Office of the
Town and City Clerk of the City and shall delineate
the fire service boundaries of the
respective regular and Volunteer Fire Departments.
Changes in Fire Service Districts may
be made by ordinance adopted by a two-thirds
vote of the total membership of the Board of
Representatives with the advice of the City
Fire and Rescue Chief and the respective
Chief of the Volunteer Fire Department
affected.
The defendants argue that the introductory word “Jurisdiction”
CT Page 6616
as used in this charter relates to a geographical area
of authority or control. The sentences which follow define the
jurisdiction of the fire departments in the city of Stamford. The
Fire and Rescue Department operates under the control of its
chief in the city fire service district. The fire service
districts are delineated on a map and their boundaries cannot be
changed except by the action of the Board of Representatives as
set forth above. The downtown department cannot operate in the
other districts “except in the case of an emergency.” Practice,
of course, has dictated that these fire departments, through
their mutual aid agreements, enter each other’s districts in
emergencies. No emergency existed on February 9, 1996. Semmel did
not claim an emergency existed in his interview, although he was
attempting to sway public opinion with a sense of urgency. The
court rejects the more tortured interpretation of this section of
the charter posited by the defendants and finds that the plain
language of this section is clear as to the issue before the
court. That language, crucial to the plaintiffs’ argument, is the
language which states that “Nothing in this Charter shall be
construed to affect the organization, status or property of the
Volunteer Departments of Stamford.” The court finds that
“nothing” indeed means “no thing.”
The plaintiffs allege that the mayor violated § C5-40-3
of the charter when he ordered Engine 6 to Station 2 because that
action interfered with the organization, status and property of
the company. The defendants argue that the mayor’s action did not
violate the charter as it did not involve any change in the
internal structure of the company, its status as a volunteer
fire company, or its ownership of property. They contend that
the chief of the fire company acquiesced in, or consented to the
transfer of Engine 6 of the downtown department to Long Ridge
Station 2 by not contesting the transfer nor seeking the removal
of Engine 6. The court does not agree with the defendants’
positions.
The stationing of sixteen fire fighters whose employer is the
city of Stamford and whose chief is the chief of the downtown
department affects the organization and status of the volunteer
company. These sixteen fire fighters are not employees of the
volunteer company in which they serve. The volunteer company’s
ability to control its operations is weakened by the presence
of outside personnel and equipment. The “downtown” fire fighters
belong to a different bargaining unit than the fire fighters of
the volunteer company. They belong to Local 786 of the IAFF,
CT Page 6617
which consists of all uniformed and investigatory positions
within the Stamford Fire Department. The plaintiff members of the
LRFC belong to the LRPDA/Local 786 of the IAFF which is the
exclusive bargaining agent for the paid professional firefighters
of the LRFC. In their labor contract, the volunteer company and
the union/association “recognize the association for working out
the terms and working conditions for the contract.” The LRFC
cannot negotiate with the city fire fighters in the event of
problems which might cause conflict with the terms of the downtown
fire fighters labor contract, or which might arise between its
own employees and the downtown employees. While the court finds
that the friction which exists between both groups is largely
selfinduced, the fact remains that an outside fire fighting
force is stationed in the Long Ridge Fire District and affects
the organization, status and property of the LRFC.
The property of the company is affected because the sixteen
fire fighters have their own truck which the volunteer company
does not own. It is stationed on the property of the volunteer
company. Section 12 of the constitution and by-laws of the LRFC
speaks of the duties of the trustees. “It shall be the duty of
the Trustees to supervise the performance of the line officers,
administrative officers, salaried employees and the general
membership. They shall also hire non-members or engage service
organizations to perform services or functions not performed by
members, such as annual audits, tax preparation and other
financial and legal work as approved by the membership. It shall
further be the duty of the Trustees to take charge of all Company
properties, to receive for inspection an inventory of all properties
from the Chief, to submit such inventory at the July meeting
of the Company, to examine the state of the Company’s finances
and accounts, to examine all bills against the Company, to
recommend measures to preserve the Company’s credit, to examine
the financial records of the Company and to issue a report
about the financial status of the Company in writing, no later
than the regular meeting following the July meeting. It shall
further be the duty of the trustees to issue written procedures
for the acquisition and disposal of Company properties and
enforce compliance with such rules.”
The trustees are authorized to “take charge of all Company
properties” and this court finds that power to include the use of
the company’s fire station to house non-company equipment. The
trustees were not consulted by the mayor or any of the other
defendants before Engine 6 was transferred. The fact that some or
CT Page 6618
all of the trustees resigned in the wake of this lawsuit has no
bearing upon the resolution of this issue. The mayor’s action
therefore, interfered with the organization and property of the
fire company in violation of § C5-40-3 of the charter. The
defendants further argue that the transfer of Engine 6 received
the approval of Chief Semmel and therefore, has not violated
the charter. The defendants also argue that Chief Higgins, a
successor to Semmel, never told the city to remove the city
equipment and personnel. Therefore, they argue this constitutes
acquiescence on the part of the plaintiffs. Without color of
acquiescence the defendants agree that the city cannot claim
the right to assign the downtown fire fighters to Long Ridge as
that claim “would have an effect on the property” of the company.
(Defendants’ Brief, Feb. 11, 1998, p. 19.)
The constitution and by-laws of the fire company provide for
its membership, voting rights and general rules of governance.
Article V describes the duties of officers and trustees. Section
6 sets forth the duties of the chief. “It shall be the duty of
the Chief to take command of all the fire fighting and emergency
services of the Company. He shall be in charge of all personnel
under his command. He shall hold at least one monthly meeting
with the other line officers. He shall submit to the Executive
Board recommendations concerning the operational rules to be
contained in the Company Standing Rules, specifically, regulations
and procedures having to do with fire and other emergencies,
duties of line officers by rank, duties of paid personnel, and
use of equipment. He shall prepare a written inventory for
inspection to the Trustees. He shall be responsible for the
appointment of appointed officers.”
The court finds that the chief had no power to acquiesce in,
or consent to, the mayor’s unilateral action in sending Engine 6
to Station 2.
The defendants also argue that the last sentence of §
C5-40-3(d) of the charter deals the plaintiffs’ arguments a fatal
blow. That section provides that “Changes in Fire Service Districts
may be made by ordinance adopted by two-thirds vote of the
total membership of the Board of Representatives with the advice
of the City Fire and Rescue Chief and the respective Chief of the
Volunteer Fire Department affected.” This court does not agree
with the defendants. Where the charter allows a change, it
provides the method of change, on the aforementioned issue, to wit:
a vote by two-thirds of the total membership of the board of
CT Page 6619
representatives, the legislative body of the city. This section
cannot be cited, therefore, for the proposition that an individual
city official can affect a change in the organization, status or
property of the fire company.
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that the
defendants lacked the authority to send Engine 6 to Station 2. The
court finds that there is a likelihood that the plaintiffs will
prevail on the merits of the case with regard to the charter
violation.
The court also finds that the plaintiffs have suffered
irreparable harm and have no adequate remedy at law. In Scalo v.
Mandanici, 179 Conn. 140 , 145 , 425 A.2d 1272 (1979), the court
stated that “taxpayers have a right to maintain a suit to enjoin
the enforcement of an invalid statute or ordinance where its
enforcement will require the expenditure of public funds.” The
court emphasized that “[t]here is little dispute that the
unauthorized disbursement of public funds by a municipality presents
a situation which can best be remedied by an injunctive order.
The payments, if continued, would be irretrievably lost, to the
detriment of the plaintiffs and other residents and taxpayers of
the city. . . .” Id. Similarly, in the present case, the
defendants have illegally assigned sixteen fire fighters to Long Ridge
Station 2 at a cost of $1.2 million. The two fire fighters
requested by the LRFC would merely cost $150,000. Accordingly, the
plaintiffs, as taxpayers of Stamford, may enjoin the defendants’
unauthorized disbursement of public funds.
The court concludes that the harm that may be caused by the
injunction does not outweigh the harm that the plaintiffs are
likely to suffer if such relief is denied. The facts in Board of
Education v. Ellington, 151 Conn. 1 , 193 A.2d 466 (1963) are
analogous to the facts in the present case. The board of
education of the town of Ellington submitted an estimate of its
annual budget requirements to the board of finance of that
town. Id., 4. The board of finance recommended to the town
meeting a total appropriation that was less than the amount
requested by the board of education. Id. The board of finance,
however, recommended that there be included in the budget for
general government services two special appropriations that
were to be used for school purposes. Id. The recommendations made
by the board of finance were approved at the town meeting. Id.,
5. The board of education sought an injunction for the transfer
of the special appropriations from the general government
CT Page 6620
budget to the board of education’s budget. Id., 3. The trial
court issued the injunction and the Supreme Court of Connecticut
noted that the recommendation and approval of the special
appropriations was tantamount to a determination that these
funds were necessary and within the financial resources of the
town. Id., 13.
The reasoning of the Supreme Court in Ellington is applicable
here. By providing sixteen fire fighters to Station 2 at
a cost of $1.2 million, the city of Stamford has demonstrated
that the LRFC’s request for $150,000 is both necessary and
affordable. Consequently, Stamford can, without great harm, provide
the fire company with the money necessary to hire two additional
fire fighters who will replace the sixteen fire fighters. The
residents of the Long Ridge fire district will then have
sufficient fire protection without having to pay additional taxes to
support the sixteen fire fighters.
Accordingly, the court grants the plaintiffs’ requests for a
temporary injunction and enjoins the defendants from interfering
with the organization, status and property of the LRFC and
further enjoins the defendants from continuing to station fire
fighters from the Stamford Fire and Rescue Department at Station
2.
The plaintiffs seek an order enjoining the defendants from
interfering with the collective bargaining relationship between
the LRFC and its professional fire fighters. The defendants argue
that the court lacks jurisdiction to enjoin the defendants since
the plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative
remedies.
The court finds the following additional facts relevant to
the disposition of this application for temporary injunction.
Although there had been consolidation discussions before February
9, 1996, the court finds that, throughout 1996, the city labor
negotiator, Haselkamp, threatened the LRPDA negotiators with
the loss of jobs in the event the paid drivers did not agree with
the city’s proposals that they become city employees. This job
loss would be accomplished through the budget process. Haselkamp
stated that the funds appropriated for the LRFC would not be
released thereby leading to lay-offs. In fact, funds that were to
be issued to the LRFC were delayed for several weeks at one point
CT Page 6621
causing the chief to tell the paid drivers that he might have to
issue pink slips. The defendants point out that Haselkamp had no
authority to cause the fire fighters to lose their jobs.
Nevertheless, the paid drivers took these threats to heart believing
that they could be replaced by city fire fighters at any time
inasmuch as the city had already assigned Engine 6 to Station 2.
The negotiations concerning consolidation included such
topics as the change of the paid drivers’ status as LRFC
employees to employees of the downtown department. This status
change would mean that the LRPDA would no longer exist as the
drivers’ bargaining agent. The drivers would participate in
the city fire fighters’ pension plan which could create a
discrepancy in benefits. The pension benefits of the paid
drivers, all of whom are lieutenants, would be based upon the
fire fighters’ rate rather than the lieutenants’ rate. The
drivers would no longer contribute to, or have contributions
made to, the social security system. They would not be able to
earn additional quarters under the social security system as fire
fighters. At present, the paid drivers have $50,000 life
insurance policies with LRFC. Were they to become city employees
the amount might not be $50,000 but could be less depending upon
their salary. In addition, the city proposed that lieutenants
of Long Ridge be paid according to the fire fighters’ rate of pay
rather than the lieutenants’ rate.
Article XIX of the collective bargaining agreement of the
Association/Company provides that “The Company shall make
reasonable efforts to cause the City to include the employees of the
company in the workmen’s compensation and health insurance
coverage which the City provides for personnel employed by the City
Fire Department. In the interim, and until replaced, by a City
administered plan, subject to acceptance by all parties, the
Company shall provide and pay for each employee and family:
hospital, medical, major medical, life insurance and dental
plans.” It would appear that the members of the LRPDA seek to be
included in at least the city’s health plan despite the
opposition of the plaintiffs.
In addition, Article XX of the collective bargaining
agreement allows the company to make “every reasonable effort to
cause the City of Stamford to include the employees of the
company in the pension plan established for the Stamford Fire
Department or a comperable (sic) separate pension plan provided
by the city of Stamford.” Based on these provisions the city of
CT Page 6622
Stamford cannot be found to be interfering in the collective
bargaining relationship between the LRFC and the LRPDA in the
area of insurance benefits and pension benefits.
At the time of this hearing, the plaintiffs were without a
new contract with the LRFC. It is their belief that the LRFC has
failed to bargain collectively because of pressure from the city.
Thus, the plaintiffs are asserting a claim against the LRFC for
breaching its duty to bargain collectively, and against the city
for interfering with their efforts to bargain collectively with
the LRFC.
The plaintiffs’ claim against the LRFC is governed by the
Municipal Employee Relations Act, General Statutes §§ 7-460 to
7-479 . Under said act, “the state board of labor relations is
given the power and authority to determine whether a position is
covered by sections 7-467 to 7-477 , inclusive, in the event of a
dispute between the municipal employer and an employee
organization. General Statutes § 7-471 (2). The board of
labor relations is further empowered to resolve questions as to
whether a practice prohibited by sections 7-467 to 7-477 ,
inclusive, has been committed by a municipal employer . . . .
General Statutes § 7-471 (4). If the board of labor relations
determines that a prohibited practice has been or is being
committed, it shall . . . issue and cause to be served on the
party committing the prohibited practice an order requiring it or
him to cease and desist from such prohibited practice, and shall
take such further affirmative action as will, effectuate the
policies of sections 7-467 to 7-477 . . . .” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Sampietro v. Board of Fire Commissioners,
200 Conn. 38 , 42-43 , 509 A.2d 28 (1986).
“We have frequently stated that `[w]hen an administrative
remedy is provided by law, relief must be sought by exhausting
this remedy before resort to the courts.’” (Citations omitted.)
Sampietro v. Board of Fire Commissioners, supra,
“`The doctrine of exhaustion [of administrative remedies] is
grounded in a policy of fostering an orderly process of
administrative adjudication and judicial review in which a
reviewing court will have the benefit of the agency’s findings
and conclusions. To allow a party . . . to bypass the entire
process . . . would be to interject an unnecessary and
potentially confusing element into an otherwise well-defined
area of the law.’” Connecticut Mobile Home Assn., Inc. v.
Jensens’s, Inc., 178 Conn. 586 , 591 , 424 A.2d 285 (1979), quoting
CT Page 6623
Connecticut Life & Health Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Jackson,
173 Conn. 352 , 358-59 , 377 A.2d 1099 (1977).
In the present case, the LRFC is a municipal employer, as
defined by the Municipal Employee Relations Act. The LRPDA is an
employee organization and its members are employees of the
volunteer company. Further, the LRPDA has been designated by the
state board of labor relations as the representative of the fire
company employees. Article I, the recognition clause, of the
labor agreement between the LRFC and the LRPDA, states as
follows: “The Company hereby recognizes the Union/Association as
the exclusive representative and bargaining agent for the paid
professional fire fighters of the Company. In addition, the
Company and the Union/Association do hereby recognize the
Association for working out the terms and working conditions for
the contract.” The signatories to this contract are the LRFC
president and chief, and the respective presidents of Local 786
of the IAFF and the LRPDA.
Although the company may have failed to bargain collectively,
the plaintiffs have not filed an unfair labor practice
claim with the state board of labor relations. The “orderly
process of administrative adjudication and judicial review . . .
requires that the plaintiff seek his remedy before the agency
charged with administration of the Municipal Employee Relations
Act.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Sampietro v. Board of Fire Commissioners, supra,
Because the plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative
remedies, this court lacks jurisdiction to decide whether the
company has failed to bargain collectively.
The LRPDA shares its bargaining agent status with Local 786
of the IAFF. Local 786 of the IAFF represents the interests of
the downtown fire fighters and it is the downtown fire fighters
whose excess numbers it must protect against lay-offs. The union,
therefore, has a conflict with regard to the interests of the
LRPDA. It may well be that an action lies against the union for
an unfair labor practice. Even if the union were a party to this
action, however, this court would not have jurisdiction because
pursuant to the Municipal Employee Relations Act this issue must
first be heard by the state board of labor relations.
Although the Municipal Employee Relations Act applies to the
plaintiffs’ claim against the LRFC, it does not apply to the
plaintiffs’ claim against the city. The Municipal Employee
CT Page 6624
Relations Act does not apply because the city is not a party to
the plaintiffs’ collective bargaining agreement with the LRFC.
The Municipal Employee Relations Act only proscribes the conduct
of employers, including their representatives or agents, and em
ployee organizations. General Statutes § 7-470 . Thus, this
court has jurisdiction to decide whether the city has interfered
with the plaintiffs’ collective bargaining agreement with the
LRFC.
The court finds that because the city held consolidation
discussions with representatives of the LRPDA, the LRFC and Local
786 of the IAFF in the presence of Romaniello, its president, the
city did not interfere with the collective bargaining
relationship between the company and its professional fire
fighters.
The city’s threats to use the budget process to obtain the
consent of the LRPDA to its conditions may have interfered with
the company’s ability to collectively bargain with its own
employees. Furthermore, by stationing Engine 6 at Station 2 the
city may very well have interfered with the provisions of Article
XXVII of the collective bargaining agreement which asserts the
LRFC’s right “to determine all matters affecting the operation of
the company, including but not limited to the right to direct and
control the firefighting force.” The proper party to assert
claims of this type is the LRFC.
For the foregoing reasons, the court declines to enjoin the
defendants